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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The legal issues tc be resolved in this appeal involve the District Court's legal a.11aiysis 
and reasoning on both the facts and process in the post-conviction matter of Brent Reece 
(hereinafter "Reece"). At issue on the facts is whether Reece set forth valid claims for post-
conviction, whid1 all we1e :,u:mrnarily dismissed by tbe District Ccurt. First, Reece set forth 
facts of a Brady claim in that there w:::is evidP,nce withheld by the State that would have allowed 
Reece to 1:ross-examint an Idaho State Forensics Lab employee, Lamora Lewis, at his 
underlying criminal trial. Ms. Lewis testified that she follows certain procedures on all evidence 
both alcohol and drugs - as an Idaho State Forensics Lab Employee, which Reece could now 
impeach with the newly discovered evidence. Second, Reece set forth facts to show ineffective 
assistance of his underlying criminal counsel in failing to raise a suppression issue relative to 
Reece's forced blood draw. As to the pracess o::::'R~ece's post-convi~tion cas~, Reece appeals the 
District Court's failure to give Reece twenty (20) days to respond to the Court's final 
justification in dismissing Reece's Brady claim. 
B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND THE DISPOSITION 
Reece filed his V crificd Petition for Post Conviction Relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 
et. seq. (hereinafter, the "Petition"). (CR 3). The District Court, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
4906(b ), filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss all of Reece's post-conviction claims. (CR 159). 
Reece timely filed a reply to the same. (CR 529). At the time that Reece filed his reply, he also 
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filed a Motion for Discovery relative to his Brady claim. (CR 195). The District Court then 
entered its Memorandum Decision re: Notice of Intent to Dismiss, in which the Court denied 
Reece's Motion for Discovery and further dismissed all of Reece's claims (hereinafter, the 
"Memorandum Decision"). (CR 200). The District Court further filed its Judgment of 
Dismissal. (CR 222). Reece filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Opportunity to 
Respond IR.C.P. l J(a)(2), l.C. § 19-4906(b), moving the District Court, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 19-4906(b), to give Reece twenty (20) days to respond to the new issues as raised in the 
Memorandum Decision as they related to Reece's Brady claim. (CR 224). However, the District 
Court denied the motion for reconsideration. ~CR 227). A Notice of Appeal was fiied. (CR 
231 ). The matter waa remaaded by the Idaho Supreme Court, and an Amend€d Judgmem of 
Dismissal was entered. (CR 234). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
·rhe applicable facts underlying this pust-convidion lawsui't have not been disputed. 
Reec1: was charged with Felony Driving Under the Influence, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-
8004 in Jerome Co1Jnty Case no CR-2010-3861. The matter went to tri,d, in which several 
w1messes restified against Reece. Of hnpt)rt, first, Officer Edward Gates testified as b the 
investigation of Reece for the charge. (CR 45 114). Part of Officer Gates's testimony was that 
he and an0ther officer forcibly withdrew Reece's bk>od, despite R1;:ece's resistance to it. One 
officer sat on Reece's right shoulder while another controlleJ liis left &rm by kncclir..g on it 
during the forced blood draw. (CR 54-55 at p. 72, LL 23-25 and at p.73, LL 8-10). Reece 




















continually protested his forced blood draw, by stating, "You're not going to get my blood." 
(CR55atp. 73,Ll.13-19). 
Following Reece's blood draw, his blood was sent to the Idaho State Forensics Lab 
(hereinafter, "ISFL"). At trial, Lamora Lewis from ISFL testified as the analyst who tested 
Reece's blood for its blood alcohol content. (CR 77 - 83). As part of her testimony, Ms. Lewis 
did not limit her testimony to alcohol testing. Ms. Lewis used the term "an evidence" several 
time:; in her testimony in describing the process that she followt:d i11 aliege<lly testing Reece' s 
blood. (CR 77-78 atp.160, Ll. 13-14; p. 161, L. 17; and p. 162, L. 17). Ms. Lewis defined what 
"an evidence" meant when she stated, "Whenever an evidence comes in, a unique laboratory 
number is assigned to thr.t piece of evidence, whether it's blood alcohol ,K other drugs or any 
evidence at ail that we analyze.·' (CR 77 at p.160, Li. l 3-20) (Emphasis added) 
Ms. Lewis further testified at length about the general operating procedures that she 
allegedly followed in testing Reece's blood, as it was "evidence", which included: (a) receiving 
a piece of evidence into the lab (CR 77 at p. 161, Ll. 17-22); (b) signing a receipt for the 
evidence (See id); ( c) entering the evidence into a trackiag svstcx (CR 78 at p. 162, LI. 17-22); 
(d) placing the evidence in a siofing area (CR 73 at r,. 162, Ll. 21-22); (e) assigniGg the piece of 
evidence with a laboratory number (CR 77 at p. 160, LI. 14-15); (t) placing the evidence into a 
tracking systtm (CR 77 at p. 160, LL 18-20); (g) assigning 1he evidence 10 an analyst (CR 77 at 
p. 160. L. 21); (h) checkmg out the evidence from the forensics eviderice specialist (CR 77 at p. 
160, Lt. 22-24); (i) creating a task sheet and entering trie identifying infonnation on the task sheet 
(CR 77 at p. 163, Lt. 16-20); G) ensuring that the evidence seal has not been tampered with (CR 


















77 at p. 164, LI. 18-19); (k) analyzing the evidence (CR 77 at p. 160, LI. 24-25), (1) checking the 
name on the evidence against the submission form (CR 77 at p. 160, L. 25 through P. 161, L 4), 
and (m) checking the tracking system for additional information (CR 77 at p. 161, LI. 14-16). 
Ms. Lewis's summarized her testimony in stating the following in relation to the 
procedure in Reece's case: 
Q. Okay. And did you - did you do that particular procedure with the 
sample that you obtained involving Mr. Reece? 
A. I do it with every sample that I receive. 
(CR 78 at p. 165. Ll. 2-5) 
No other witness other than Lamora Lewis was called to testify as to the results of testing 
Reece's blood. Following trial, Reece was found guilty of Felony Driving Under the Influence, a 
violation of (daho Code § 18-8004. 
Following his tfial anJ after his appeal, Reece learned that the State withheld and 
suppressed information that was favorable to Reece's defense in relation to Lamora Lewis. (CR 
4-6). Such information was contamed ir. an Office of Professional Standards Admiaistrative 
Investigation Report. (CR 15-32). Through the same, Reece learned that Lamoi'a Lewis, wirh 
others, held a "show and tell" box at the lSFL, which contained illegal substances that were 
taken from evidence in cases. (CR 16). Some of the items had case numbers, while others did 
not. (CR 19). Ms. Lewis was the one who ret1ieved the box from the ceiling when confronted. 
(CR 16). The illegal substances were intentionally withheld from audits. Id. Ms. Lewis "never 
checked the reference material logs" on the items. (CR 20). 
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Additionally, the same report showed that Ms. Lewis was trained in a manner that "is 
against all policy and procedures". (CR 19). Rocklan McDowell, Lamora's trainer, "told her 
about the box, told her that it needed to be put away so the auditors didn't find it, [sic] because 
they would make them get rid of it." (CR 20). Ms. Lewis further documented how Mr. 
McDowell was deficient as her trainer. (CR 23). Ms. Lewis reported that she will make efforts 
to not follow her training and to "make sure all the policies are followed", "make sure everything 
is done like it is supposed to be based 011 the analytical method'', and that she will ''not cut any 
comers". Id. 
Followmg Reece's post-conviction petition, The District Court, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
! 9-4906(b ), filed a Notice of Intent to Di:;miss all of Reece's post-conviction daims. ( CR 159). 
ln relation to Reece's Brady claim, the District Court ruled that th0 District Court w0uld not have 
ailuwed the information in at the crimina! trial beca11se it would "confuse the issues". (CR 176). 
Reece timely filed a reply to the same. (CR 529). At the time that Reece filed hi-. reply, he also 
filed a lvfotion for Discove;y relative to his Brady claim, so that he could further discover 
Lamora Lewis's imprqper couduct and training. (CR 195). The District Court then entered its 
Iv1emorandum Decision and further dismissed all of Reece's claims. (CR 200). ln relation to 
Reece's Brady claim, the District Court changed its reasoning for dismissing the same under the 
reason that Reece had not established pr"!judice. (f;R 207- l 0). 
Reece filed a Motion for Recon:-;ideration .ind Request for Opportunity to RPspnnd 
IR.CP. JJ(a)(2}, JC § 19-4906(h), moving the District Court, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-
4906(b), to give Reece twenty (20) days to respond to the new issues as raised in the 




















Memorandum Decision as they related to Reece's Brady claim. (CR 224). However, the District 
Court denied the motion for reconsideration. (CR 227). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err when it summarily dismissed Reece's Brady claim by finding 
that the District Court would not have allowed the impeachment evidence during the underlying 
criminal trial and that the lack of the impeadlillent evidence during the underlying crirninal i:rial 
did not prejudice Reece? 
2. Did the trial court err when it summarily dismissed Reece's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim by holding that ~he legal analysis of State v. Diaz was grounds to sanliTia.rily 
dismiss the claim? 
3. Did the trial court err when it did not give Reece the opportunity to respond to its legal 
reasoning in its Memorandum Decision? 
IIJ. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An application for pos1.-conviccion reiit:f initiates a civil proceeding. Hall v. State, 
151 Idaho 42, 45 (2011 ). The summary dismissal of a post-conviction action is permissible 
when the pedtivner fai b tu raise a genuine issue of material fact !hat, if resoived in his or her 
favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested reiief. Idah..9_rude § 19-4906; Murphy v. 
State, 143 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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A court may only dismiss a petition when there is no issue of material fact. Kirkland v. 
State, 143 Idaho 544, 546 (Idaho 2006). "Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to 
J.C.§ 19-4906(b) is the equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Dunlap v. State, 
126 Idaho 901, 904 (Idaho App. 1995) (citing Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87 (Ct. app. 1987) 
(emphasis added)). 
Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a 
preponderrmer of evidence the allegations upon which the request for 
post-conviction relief is based. An application for post-conl'iction relief 
dibers from a compiairit in an ordi,zary civil a.::tion, however, for an 
application must contain much more than 'a short and plain statement of 
the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). 
Rather, an application for post-conviction reiief must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, r;;cords or oth~.- evidence supporting its allegations n1ust be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence in 
not included with the petition. LC. * 19-4903. 
Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836, 838 (Idaho App. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, when there 
exists a material issue of fact, summary dismissal of a. post-conviction petition is not vvarrnnted. 
See, e g .. State v. Cobb, 100 Idaho 116 0979) (The Idaho Supreme Ccurt held that summarily 
disrni;;;;sing th~ post-conv~ction petition was incorrect because there existed a material issue of 
fact as to the elemc:nts uf the petitione;:'s claim). 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, this C::mrt must determine whethc:1 a genuine issue of materitil fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file." A1cKinney v. ,\'tatc, 
133 ldaho 695,700,992 P.2d !44, 149 (1999). (Ctiation omitted). "Inferences are liberally 
construed in favor of the nonrnoving party." Id. 






















A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DISMISSED REECE'S 
BRADY CLAIM BECAUSE THE CONCEALED EVIDENCE COULD IMPEACH 
MS. LEWIS'S TESTIMONY RELATIVE TO TESTING OF ALL SUBSTANCES, 
BOTH ALCOHOL AND DRUGS. 
The First Count in Reece's Petition was pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1 Q61), which Reece brought pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4901 (a)(l ). (CR 4-6). Reece asserted 
that newiy discovered e:vidence of improper c<)ndnct of Lamora Lewis, a technician at the ISFL, 
who also testified at Reece's trial. (CR 4-6). The District Court set forth essentially two 
justifications for dismissing Reece's Brc!dy claim. The first justification in the Notice of Intent 
was that the District Court would not have allowed the information because it would "confuse 
the issues". (CR 176). The second justification as set forth in Lhe Memorandam Decision was 
that Reece was not prejudiced by not having the opportunity to cross examine Lamora Lewis at 
his trial with the new evidence. (CR 8-11 ). 
As to the District Courf s first Justification for dismi:~sal, tl1c trial ~ourt set forth the 
incorrs:ct kgal standard in dismissing Reece's Brady claim in the Nmice cf Intent. Th~ trial 
court stated, "Had the report or any information regarding the lab's inadequate practices been 
available at the time of the trial, this <.dll!!J. would not have likely allowed Reece to impeach 
Lewis because tlie information would have confusetl the issues." (CR 176) (emphasis added). 
This statement does not adequately analyze the standard of whether Reece raised a genuine issue 
of material fact- the standard used on a summary dismissal. Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836, 
838 (Idaho App. 1995). It was upon this faulty analysis that the Court made its determination. 
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Additionally, in rendering its decision as set forth in the Notice of Intent, the District 
Court incorrectly analyzed the facts in stating: 
(CR 176). 
The report [ of the concealed evidence] does not indicate any mishandling 
of evidence in cases, including the Petitioner's case. Lewis and other staff 
members' failure to abide by internal policy, [sic] does not render their 
handling of aU evidence invalid. The investigation into the staff members 
was unrelated to Lewis's testimony regarding the Petitioner's test results. 
The Petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine 
J ,amora Lewis with regard to how she handled evidence in his case. 
In reviewing Lamora Lewis's testimony in this matter, it is clear that the District Court 
did not corredly analyze the facts because Ivis, Lewis, hersett: opened the dl>or to l:hafo:nging 
her testimony in Reece's case. First, Ms. Lewis did not li!ni1 her tcstirnc-ny to a!cchc! te~ting. 
Ms. Lewis used the term "an evidence" several times ir. her testimony in describing the process 
that she followed in allegedly testing Reece's blood. (CR 77-78 atp.160, Ll. 13-14; p. 161, L. 
17; and p. 162, L. 17). Ms. Lewis defined wh2t "sn evidence" meant when she stated, 
"Whenever an evidence comes in, a unique laboratory number is assigned to that piece of 
evidence, wheiher ii's blood alcohol or other drugs or anv evidence at all that we analvze.'· 
(CR 77 at p. 160, Ll. 13-20) (Empha:.::is added). Therefore, Ms. Lewis, herse~f, stated that her 
testimony as to her practices on evidence applies to "any evidence at all that [ISFL] analyze[s]." 
FL.rthen:nore, Ms. Lewis testified at length about the generai operating procedure::; that 
she allegedly followed in testing Rce.)c's blood, as it was "evidence". Such procedures included: 
(a) rccci':ing a piece of evidence into the lab (CR 77 at p. 161, U 17-22); (b) signing a receipt 
for the evidence (See id); (c) entering the evidence into a tracking system (CR 78 at p. 162, Ll. 




















17-22); (d) placing the evidence in a storing area (CR 78 at p. 162, Ll. 21-22); (e) assigning the 
piece of evidence with a laboratory number (CR 77 at p. 160, Ll. 14-15); (f) placing the evidence 
into a tracking system ( CR 77 at p. 160, Ll. 18-20); (g) assigning the evidence to an analyst (CR 
77 at p. 160, L. 21); (h) checking out the evidence from the forensics evidence specialist (CR 77 
at p. 160, Ll. 22-24); (i) creating a task sheet and entering the identifying information on the task 
sheet (CR 77 at p. 163. Ll. 16-20); (j) ensuring that the evidence seal has not been tampered with 
(CR 77 at p. 164, Ll. 18-19); (k) analyzing the evidence (CR 77 at p. 160, Ll. 24-25), (I) 
checking the name on the evidence against the submission form (CR 77 at p. 160, L. 25 through 
P. 161, L. 4), and (m) checkmg the tracking system for additional information (CR 77 at p. 161, 
Ll. 14-16). 
Ms. Lewis's summarized her testimony m stating rhe following in relation to the 
procedure in Reece's case: 
Q. Okay. And did you - did you do that particulm procedure with the 
san1ple that you obtained involving Mr. Reece? 
A. I do ;t with even, sample t.lw.t I receive 
(CR 7'(', at p. 165. LI. l-5) ( Emphasis added). This precess, as testified by Ms. Lewis, estabEshed 
the foundation for ail of her testimony in Reece's trial. Because Ms. Lewis both testified that she 
followed this procedure with "every sample" that she receives and that the procedures related to 
'"othet drugs or ~my evidecce at all thai we ~m11iyze", Ms. Lewis, he1self, oµened the door to 
allow the new evidence to impeach all of her testimony (as was established by the foundation of 
the process iv1s. Lewis testified to) in Reece's underlying trial. As such, the District Court's 
conclusion that Lamora Lewis's misconduct was unrelated to Reece's case was incorrect. 



















Next, as to the District Court's statements in the Memorandum Decision, the Court's 
analysis that Reece could not establish prejudice was again incorrect. While Reece never had an 
opportunity to respond to the Court's analysis, as set forth below, the prejudice in this matter is 
clear at least to the point that Reece raised a genuine issue of material fact in the same. Of 
course, one of the elements of a Brady claim is that "prejudice must have ensued." State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010). "Suppression ... of evidence to an 
accused upon request violates due µrocess where the evidence is material either to guiit or tu 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Evidence is material if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the resuit of 
the pro;.;eeding would have been different." Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27-'.i.8, 995 P.2J 7J-1-, 
797-98 (2000) (Citations omitted). 
Analysis of the prejudice that Reece faced in not being able to cross examine Lamora 
Lewis at trial wi1h the concealed evidence begins with what the concealed eviden~e was. In 
summary, the rlocument produced by Reece in his Petition shows that Lamora Lewis, with 
others, held a "show and tell" box, which contained illegal substanres that were taken from 
evidence m cases. (CR 16). However, some ~,fthe iiern:, had case numbers, whlie others did not. 
(CR 19). Ms. Lewis was the one who retrieved the box from the ceiling when confronted. (CR 
16). The iH~ga1 substances 1Nere intentionc:1lly withheld from audits. Id. Ms. Lewis "never 
checked the reference material logs" on the items. (CR 20). This brief summary of information 
produced by Reece prcvides the factuc:11 basis to impeach all of the items (a) through (m) as 
provided above because Ms. Lewis's testimony that she follows a standard procedure with all 



















evidence "every sample that [she receives]" was clearly not the truth. As such, Reece 
established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether these facts could have been used by 
Reece at his trial to impeach Ms. Lewis. 
Additionally, Ms. Lewis testified as to her training at the ISFL so as to lay the foundation 
of her testimony. The concealed evidence further could have been used to challenge Ms. 
Lewis's information on the same. The information shows that Ms. Lewis was trained in a 
manner that ''is against all policy and procedures". (CR 19). Rocklan l'v1cDowdl, Larnora's 
trainer, "told her about the box, told her that it needed to be put away so the auditors didn't find 
it, [sic] because they would make them get rid of it." (CR 20). Ms. Lewis further documented 
how Mr. McDowell was deficieat as he, trainet. (CR 23). In fact, Ms. Lewis rep01ted that she 
will make efforts to not follo\'1 her training and to "make sure all the policies are followed'', 
"make sure everything is done like it is supposed to be based 011 the analytical method", and that 
she wili "not cut any corners"'. Id. 
Thus, the conce;:;lcd evidence furthe;· shows that the concealed infom1ation by !Sf<L could 
have also been used to impeach Ms. Lewis as to her trainmg at ISFL, which was ciearly pa.rt of 
her testimony. As such, under this information, Reece has set torth additional facts which raised 
a genuine issue of material fact as to the use of the information as impeachment evidence against 
Ms. Lewis for Reece's Brady aiiegation. 
Ms. Lewis was the only witness that testified as to the blood alcohol content ot Reece at 
the time of his aileged offenst:. Moreover, as to her testimony, Ms. Lewis us;:;d the testimony as 
to the procedure that she allegedly followed in Reece's case as she testified she does with all 
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evidence -- to bolster her position as an expert and to lay the foundation for her conclusion in 
Reece's case. As such, Reece was clearly prejudiced in not having the concealed information to 
impeach Ms. Lewis in the critical inquiry of the testing of his blood as evidence. 
8. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT REECE'S TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS NOT Il'-TEFFECTIVE IN F AILI1'JG TO BRING A MUfION TO SUPPRESS 
HIS FORCED BLOOD DRAW WHEN IT RELIED WHOLLY ON STATE V DIAZ. 
Reece's second claim in his Petition was based upon the ineffective assistance of his 
criminal counsel for failing to com1sel him on and move to suppress his forcetl biood draw. (CR 
7-9). While Reece argued that Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) was determinative 
of his case, the District Court cited State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) as whoiiy 
instructive a;1d gave law enfor(.;ement the right to withdraw Reece's blood, dcspit~ hiJ complete 
and physical refusal of the same. (CR 167). The summary dismissal of tht: Distrid Court was 
incorrect, as Reece submitted facts raised at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
his counsei should have filed a motion to suppress because of the forced blood <lraw. 
First, the dear distinction in Reece's case from that of Diaz is that Reece physically 
res1c;;tea the biood draw. In Diaz, the defendant was transported t0 a hospital where a technician 
drew his blood. id. at 302, 160 P .3d. ai 7 41 (2007). Diaz did not phys1cally resisi: transportation 
to the hospital or his blood draw. Id. In Reece's case, one officer sat on Reece's right shoulder 
whiie anotl1er controlied his left arm hy kneeling on it during the forced blood <lraw (CR 54-55 
at p. Tl, LL 23-2.'.) and at p.'13, LL 8-10). Reece continuallv proksted his forct;d blood draw, by 
stating, "Yoi.l're not goiag to get my blood." (CR 55 at p. 73, Ll i3-19). These facts show a 
stark distinction from that in Diaz and created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 





















Reece's criminal attorney should have filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the 
forced blood draw. 
Additionally, given the recent United State Supreme Court Decision of Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), Reece asserts that the holdings of Diaz may be misplaced and 
therefore, the District Court was incorrect to rely on Diaz. Reece asks that this Court consider 
State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609 (Ariz. 2013), which analyzed implied consent statutes 
following McNeely. In Butler, the Supreme Court of Arizona analy1:ed implied conseni. statutes 
following McNeely: 
Contrary to the State's argument, a compelled blood draw, even when 
administered pursuant i.o rArizona's implied consent statute], is a search 
subject to Fourth Amcndraent's constraints. See Missouri v. AfcNeely, 
U.S. . 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (holding that a 
compelled blood draw taken pursuant to Missouri's implied -.:onsent law is 
subject to the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on warrantless searches). 
"Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's 'most 
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy."' Id. at 1558 ( quoting 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.CL 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 
(1985)\ 
McNe~!y s.lso forocloses the State's argumi::nt<; thfl.t reqmring warrants for 
hlood draws wiil unduly burden lr.vv enforcement officials or render 
Arizona's implierl. i:;onsent law meaningless. "Iii those drunk-drivi11g 
inwstigation::. where police officers can rcascnably obtain a v.,arrant 
before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the 
efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 
Id. at 156l. 
Id. at 87, 302 P.3d at 612 (Ariz 2013). The Arizona Couri further anaiyzed co11sent following 
lvfcNeely and held, "If the arrestee refuses, the statute specifies that a warrant is required to 
administer the test and the arrestee shall have his license suspended. We hold now that, 
independent of [Arizona's implied consent statute], the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's 

















consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw." Id. at 88, 302 P.3d at 613 (Ariz. 
2013). 
Reece asks that this Court apply the reasoning in Butler following McNeely. After all, 
the decision made by the United States Supreme Court to allow the suppression of the blood 
draw was made in light of Missouri's implied consent statute. McNeely. With this reasoning, 
and with the clear distinction from Diaz as cited above, Reece's criminal counsel should have 
counseled with liirn on a polential motion to suppress. Ree1.,;e bas submitied enough facts so as to 
survive summary dismissal of his claim for ineffective assistance of cousel. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 11\J NOT ALLOWING REECE TO ANSWER TO 
ITS NEW ANALYSIS AS SET PORTH IN THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM 
DECISION PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 19-4906(b). 
The District Court incorrectly provided additional analysis as i:o why it wa:; dismi:::sing 
Reece's Brady claim without providing Reece the opportunity to rP-spon<l to the same pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(6). Pursuant to Idaho Code § i9-4906(b). a Court can, by its own 
volition, dismiss a post-conviction petition. The District Court cannot dismiss claims on its own 
motion if it does not give the pllrtie<s a twen1.y-day i1otice stating its reasons for doing so as 
re4mred by Idaho Code§ i9-4906(b). DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602., 200 P.3d 1148, 
1151 (2009). 
Iu ihis matter, as to Reece'::; Brady claim, Reece i::miy ba<l an opportunity to respond to the 
District Court's analysis as contained in the Notice of Inte11t to Dismiss. which focused on 
whe;ther at trial the concealed evidence wauld have "confosed the issues." (CR 176). However, 
after Reece answered the Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss, the Court dismissed Reece's Brady 




















claim because the District Court found that Reece had not established prejudice. (CR 207-10). 
In fact, the Court's analysis as set forth in the Memorandum Decision analyzed the facts of the 
case in far greater detail an analysis that Reece was never given an opportunity to rebut. Reece 
requested that the Court give him the twenty days to answer in his Motion for Reconsideration 
and Request for Opportunity to Respond. (CR 224-26). The District Court denied Reece such 
an opportunity because, it reasoned, that it had put Reece on notice of its argument in the Notice 
of Intent to Dismiss that he had failed to establish prejudi~e. (CR 227-29). However, upon a 
review of the Court's analysis, this is clearly not the case. The only reference to prejudice that 
the Court referenced was in relation to an analysis under Idaho Code § 19-4901 ( a)( 4) (CR 177), 
which Rec~e r_.eve~ asserted. Reece simply never had the opp.:nt.mity to respond to the Court's 
analysis upon which the Court summarily dismissed Reece's Brady claim. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Fm the reasons set fmih above, Reece respectfully requests that this Court find that the 
district court's summary dismis~:ai of Reece s claims as set forth herein be reversed. 
DATED ihis '?J~"-liay of De(.;ember, 2013. 
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